Why China’s E-commerce Giants Just Scrapped the “Refund Only” Safety Net?

China’s e-commerce market is a phenomenon – a digital ecosystem operating at a scale and speed that often leaves Western observers breathless. It’s a landscape known for relentless innovation and unique consumer-centric features, born from hyper-competitive dynamics. One such feature, which became almost synonymous with the Chinese online shopping experience for a time, was the “仅退款” (jǐn tuì kuǎn) or “refund only” policy. Imagine ordering something online, finding it faulty, and getting your money back without even needing to send the item back – that was the reality for many Chinese consumers under certain conditions.¹

However, in a move that sent ripples through the industry, this era abruptly ended in April 2025. Leading platforms like Pinduoduo, Alibaba’s Taobao and Tmall, JD.com, and the e-commerce arms of Douyin (China’s TikTok) and Kuaishou simultaneously announced significant changes, effectively canceling or drastically overhauling the widespread, platform-driven “refund only” system.² This wasn’t just a minor tweak; it marked the dismantling of a key pillar of customer service strategy that had defined the market for years.

For an American audience accustomed to different online return norms, this shift offers a fascinating window into the unique pressures, strategies, and consequences shaping China’s digital economy. Why did such an incredibly consumer-friendly policy become so prevalent? What forces led to its dramatic reversal? And what does this tell us about the future of e-commerce, both in China and potentially beyond? This report dives into the story behind “refund only,” exploring its rise, its fall, its impact on shoppers and sellers, and how the evolving Chinese landscape compares to e-commerce practices in the US.

Decoding “Refund Only” (仅退款): A Customer Perk Unique to China?

At its core, “仅退款” (jǐn tuì kuǎn), translating literally to “only refund,” was an after-sales policy allowing online shoppers in China to receive a full refund for a purchased item without needing to return the physical product to the seller.¹ This wasn’t a universal guarantee for any purchase, but rather applied under specific circumstances defined by the e-commerce platforms. These typically included situations where the received product had significant quality issues (like damage or malfunction), severely mismatched the online description, or when the seller violated platform rules, such as unapproved shipping delays or sending the wrong item.²

The mechanics of how “仅退款” operated reveal much about the power dynamics within the Chinese e-commerce ecosystem. When a consumer encountered a qualifying issue, they could initiate a “refund only” request directly through the platform’s interface.¹ What happened next often bypassed traditional negotiation between buyer and seller. Platforms frequently intervened, sometimes automatically approving the refund if the seller failed to respond or object within a tight timeframe – often just 36 or 48 hours.⁴ The refund amount could then be directly deducted from the seller’s security deposit or reserve funds held by the platform, ensuring swift resolution for the consumer.¹

In some reported cases, platforms even integrated features designed to steer consumers towards this option. Sellers described instances where, during a chat discussion about a product issue, a platform-generated pop-up window would appear, proactively suggesting “仅退款” to the buyer. Critically, this could simultaneously disable the seller’s ability to continue the conversation, effectively cutting them out of the resolution process at a crucial moment.²⁰

Consider a scenario described in legal analysis: a consumer buys a computer chair requiring self-assembly. During assembly, they discover multiple defects – misaligned screw holes, deformed screws – culminating in the inability to securely attach the chair back, rendering it unusable. Faced with the hassle of disassembling the faulty chair and shipping it back, the consumer opts for “仅退款” and receives their money back without returning the defective product.¹ This policy was also particularly relevant for low-value items, common on platforms like Pinduoduo, where the cost of return shipping might exceed the item’s price, making a return economically illogical for all parties.² It also applied clearly to perishable goods like fresh produce if they arrived spoiled.⁷

These mechanics highlight a deliberate structural choice by the platforms. By automating decisions, setting short seller response deadlines, and even interrupting direct communication, the system created a significant power imbalance favoring the consumer experience. This wasn’t accidental; it was a strategic lever used to drive platform adoption and user loyalty in an intensely competitive market.¹ The platform effectively acted as judge, jury, and enforcer, prioritizing speed and consumer convenience, sometimes at the expense of seller fairness.

Furthermore, the policy implicitly devalued the physical goods in dispute under certain conditions. The very premise of not requiring a return signaled that, from the platform’s perspective aiming for user satisfaction and reduced operational overhead, the cost and complexity of managing the physical return outweighed the potential recovery value of the item itself, especially for low-cost goods or items with clear, easily verifiable defects.¹ This focus on transaction efficiency, however, directly led to the “goods lost, money lost” (钱货两空 – qián huò liǎng kōng) predicament that would become a major point of contention for sellers.¹

The Rise of a Controversial Policy: Competition, Trust, and the “Pinduoduo Effect”

While “仅退款” became a defining feature of Chinese e-commerce in the early 2020s, its conceptual roots trace back further and westward. E-commerce giant Amazon had introduced a “Returnless Refund” strategy in October 2017, similarly aimed at reducing operational costs for certain returns and enhancing customer satisfaction.¹

However, it was the fast-growing Chinese platform Pinduoduo that aggressively pioneered and popularized the “仅退款” model within China, starting in 2021.¹ Initially applied to categories like fresh produce and low-cost white-label goods where returns were logistically complex or uneconomical ⁷, Pinduoduo soon expanded the policy across most categories.⁷ This move was a key differentiator in its strategy to capture market share from established giants like Alibaba’s Taobao and JD.com, appealing strongly to price-sensitive consumers and those wary of cumbersome return processes.⁷

The backdrop for this was the incredibly fierce competition in China’s e-commerce sector, often described by the term “内卷” (nèijuǎn) – involution, signifying a relentless, zero-sum struggle where players expend enormous effort for diminishing returns.²⁰ In this environment, platforms felt immense pressure to outdo each other on price, service, and user experience. “仅退款” became a potent tool in this battle. Seeing Pinduoduo’s success in leveraging the policy to attract and retain users ¹⁷, other major platforms felt compelled to follow suit, despite initial skepticism.¹⁷ By late 2023 and early 2024, Taobao, JD.com, Douyin E-commerce, and Kuaishou had all implemented their own versions of “仅退款,” making it an industry standard or “标配” (biāopèi – standard configuration).¹ The sentiment “向拼多多学习” (learn from Pinduoduo) became a common refrain, highlighting the pressure to emulate the challenger’s successful tactics.¹⁷

The stated intentions behind the policy were multi-faceted. Primarily, it aimed to enhance consumer trust and streamline the shopping experience by removing a major pain point – the hassle of returns.¹ For certain types of goods, it could also reduce after-sales costs by eliminating return logistics.¹ Additionally, platforms positioned it as a way to pressure sellers into improving product quality and ensuring accurate descriptions, as the financial penalty for falling short was immediate and potentially harsh.¹

However, the rapid, widespread adoption driven by “内卷” reveals a deeper dynamic. “仅退款” wasn’t merely a customer service enhancement; it became a competitive weapon.¹⁷ Its normalization across the industry demonstrates how intense market rivalry can quickly establish extreme policies as the baseline expectation. Platforms felt they had to offer it to avoid losing users, making it a competitive necessity rather than just a service choice.²⁰

This race to adopt consumer-centric policies, fueled by a focus on user growth and transaction metrics ²⁰, potentially overshadowed concerns about the long-term health and sustainability of the seller community. The negative consequences for merchants ²⁰, while perhaps anticipated, were seemingly accepted as a cost of doing battle in the hyper-competitive market, at least until the cumulative impact became too significant to ignore.¹⁵ This suggests a potential bias towards short-term user acquisition metrics over balanced ecosystem management, a vulnerability that can arise in intensely contested platform economies.

When Convenience Backfires: The Downfall of “Refund Only”

The very features that made “仅退款” appealing to consumers – speed, simplicity, and minimal hassle – also created fertile ground for abuse. What began as a tool for legitimate consumer protection quickly morphed into a widespread problem, commonly referred to in China as “薅羊毛” (hāo yáng máo), literally “fleecing the sheep,” meaning exploiting loopholes for personal gain.²⁰

The “wool-pulling” epidemic manifested in several ways. Some consumers began filing “仅退款” requests for spurious reasons, claiming non-existent quality issues, citing minor packaging damage, or even using subjective justifications like “the food didn’t taste good” to essentially obtain products for free – a practice dubbed “0元购” (líng yuán gòu) or “zero-dollar purchase”.¹ This wasn’t limited to isolated incidents; reports emerged of professional “wool parties” and individuals systematically targeting sellers, exploiting the lenient platform rules for profit.²⁰ The scale of the issue became alarming. During the massive “Double 11” (Singles’ Day) shopping festival in 2024, complaints related to arbitrary “仅退款” accounted for a staggering 64.31% of all merchant complaints lodged nationwide, ranking as the top issue.²³ A survey indicated that around 25% of consumers admitted to using the service specifically for “薅羊毛,” with over 13% doing so frequently.²¹ Complaint platforms like Black Cat saw hundreds of thousands of posts related to the policy ⁷, and courts began handling a growing number of related disputes.¹⁹

From the seller’s perspective, “仅退款” turned into a nightmare. The most immediate impact was financial loss – the dreaded “钱货两空” (qián huò liǎng kōng), losing both the payment and the product, often compounded by bearing the initial shipping costs.¹ This created significant operational burdens, increasing costs, making inventory and financial management difficult, and causing immense stress for merchants, particularly small and medium-sized businesses.¹ Compounding the frustration was a perceived lack of recourse. Sellers reported extreme difficulty in appealing platform decisions, feeling powerless against potentially fraudulent claims due to the high burden of proof placed on them and the often automated nature of platform judgments.² The cost and complexity of pursuing legal action against individual consumers were often prohibitive, though some sellers did resort to lawsuits, occasionally winning but incurring significant expense.¹ Unsurprisingly, seller opposition to the policy was overwhelming, with surveys showing nearly 90% strongly against it.²¹ In extreme cases, desperation drove sellers to take matters into their own hands, resorting to public shaming via live streams (“直播追羊毛党” – zhíbō zhuī yángmáodǎng, live streaming the pursuit of wool-pullers) or even attempting offline confrontations to recover goods or funds.²⁰

Several factors converged to precipitate the policy’s downfall. Internally, platforms began recognizing that the rampant abuse and resulting seller backlash were creating an unsustainable ecosystem, potentially driving away legitimate merchants and degrading the overall quality of the marketplace.² There were signs of a potential strategic shift among platforms, moving away from a pure focus on low prices and user volume (“traffic-driven”) towards a more sustainable “value-driven” approach emphasizing quality and better business environments.⁸ The growing public and industry sentiment against “内卷” (anti-involution) also created pressure for more balanced practices.²

Externally, regulatory bodies like the State Administration for Market Regulation (SAMR) were reportedly paying closer attention, concerned about the policy’s impact on fair competition and the viability of merchants.² Platforms were said to have engaged in discussions with authorities regarding the changes.¹⁰ Furthermore, the existing legal framework, while not explicitly prohibiting such platform rules, offered little protection for sellers caught in the middle, highlighting a potential gap that needed addressing.²⁰

The widespread abuse wasn’t merely the result of a few bad actors; it became a systemic problem significantly enabled by platform design choices like automated approvals and inadequate verification processes.²⁰ The ease of exploitation, potentially amplified by social sharing of tactics, created a situation where even children were reportedly aware of how to potentially misuse the rule.²⁰

Ultimately, the intense seller backlash and the dawning realization of the policy’s corrosive effect on the marketplace demonstrated the inherent limits of a purely consumer-centric model in a two-sided platform economy. While prioritizing the consumer experience fueled explosive initial growth ¹, the severe negative consequences for the seller side – financial losses, operational strain, erosion of trust, and potential exit of quality merchants ¹⁵ – created profound instability. The platforms’ coordinated reversal ² signaled a crucial recognition: a healthy, sustainable marketplace requires balancing the needs and protecting the legitimate interests of both consumers and sellers.⁸ The timing also suggests that regulatory nudging likely played a role in accelerating this shift, underscoring the dynamic interplay between market forces and government oversight that often characterizes China’s technology sector.²

The New Rules of the Game: How Returns Work Now in China (Post-April 2025)

The April 2025 announcements marked a fundamental shift in how refund disputes, particularly those involving requests for refunds without returning goods, are handled on China’s major e-commerce platforms. The previous era of frequent, often automated, platform intervention in favor of the consumer has given way to a new paradigm emphasizing negotiation and seller autonomy.

The core change is this: for refund requests made after the consumer has received the goods, platforms like Pinduoduo, Taobao, JD.com, Douyin, and Kuaishou will generally no longer automatically intervene to grant a “refund only” or “refund without return”.² Instead, the primary responsibility for resolving the issue now rests with the seller and the consumer, who are expected to negotiate directly first.² Platforms are repositioning themselves as mediators of last resort, adopting a stance often described as “非必要不介入” (fēi bìyào bù jièrù) – non-intervention unless necessary.² They do, however, retain the right to step in if negotiations stall, if a seller is unresponsive within a specified timeframe (e.g., 36 hours on Pinduoduo ⁴), or if there is clear evidence of fault on either side.⁴

Reflecting this change, platforms are also adjusting their terminology. The loaded term “仅退款” (only refund) is often being replaced in platform rules and interfaces with more neutral phrases like “退款” (refund) or “退款不退货” (refund without return).² This linguistic shift signals a move away from the expectation of an automatic refund without return that “仅退款” had come to imply.

Specific platform adjustments illustrate this trend:

• Pinduoduo: Now explicitly supports seller-consumer negotiation as the first step. Platform intervention in “refund without return” cases after receipt is deemed non-essential unless negotiation fails or sellers miss response deadlines.⁴
• Taobao/Tmall (Alibaba): Stated they will no longer proactively support “仅退款” for received goods, encouraging negotiation first. They are providing sellers with expedited appeal channels and upgrading AI-driven models to identify abnormal refund requests and intercept “wool-pulling” behavior.⁴ New rules incorporating these changes are expected around July 2025.⁴ They have also introduced account integrity systems and may offer platform compensation to the damaged party in certain disputes, rather than automatically penalizing the seller.²⁴
• JD.com: Revised its rules to remove language stating the “platform has the right to execute refund without return” and replaced “仅退款” terminology.² The focus is shifted to facilitating resolution between the parties. These changes were expected to take effect around April 30, 2025.¹²
• Douyin E-commerce: Similarly emphasizes negotiation first and platform non-intervention unless necessary.⁴ However, rules still allow for refunds without return in specific scenarios (e.g., if return is impossible due to product nature like opened food or damage), with the seller responsible for arranging retrieval if desired.⁴
• 1688 (Alibaba’s B2B platform): Notably, 1688 moved even earlier, announcing the cancellation of its “仅退款” policy in March 2025. It shifted towards using account integrity assessments to judge disputes and potentially using platform funds to subsidize the aggrieved party, aiming for faster resolution.²⁴

It is crucial to understand that these changes do not necessarily eliminate the possibility of a “refund without return” altogether. This outcome may still occur if the seller agrees during negotiation, if the item’s value is negligible compared to return costs, if the product is unsuitable for return (e.g., perishables), or potentially if platform mediation deems it appropriate after negotiation fails.² What has changed fundamentally is the process and the default stance of the platforms – it is no longer an easily accessible, often automated entitlement for the consumer.

This pivot towards negotiation represents a significant course correction, moving the system back towards more traditional commercial principles where evidence, communication, and mutual agreement play a larger role in dispute resolution.³¹ The previous “仅退款” regime often bypassed these steps entirely.¹ The new approach restores a degree of procedural fairness by giving sellers a more direct role in addressing customer issues.

However, the success of this new framework hinges critically on how platforms implement their revised roles. Effective mediation requires clear rules, transparent processes, and sophisticated systems – like the fraud detection models and seller/buyer reputation scoring mentioned by Taobao ²⁴ – to fairly assess disputes when direct negotiations fail. Without robust support systems and clear guidelines for intervention, the shift could simply move the point of friction, potentially leading to prolonged disputes or new forms of frustration if platforms fail to strike the right balance between seller autonomy and effective consumer protection.

Ripple Effects: What the Change Means for Shoppers and Sellers

The dismantling of the widespread “仅退款” system inevitably creates significant adjustments for both consumers and sellers operating within China’s e-commerce ecosystem.

For Consumers:

• Shift in Process and Expectations: The most immediate impact is the loss of the near-automatic “refund only” option as a readily available safety net. Consumers now need to be prepared to engage more actively in negotiation with sellers if issues arise with received goods.⁸
• Increased Burden of Proof: Persuading a seller or, if necessary, the platform to grant a refund (especially without a return) will likely require stronger evidence. Clear photos, videos documenting defects, and maintaining communication records within the platform’s official chat tools become even more crucial.⁸
• Potentially Longer Resolution Times: Direct negotiation can be more time-consuming than the previously automated or platform-driven refund processes.⁸ Patience and persistence may be required.
• Buyer Reputation Matters: Platforms are likely to place greater emphasis on buyer credibility and purchase history when mediating disputes that escalate beyond negotiation.⁸ A history of frequent or questionable refund requests could disadvantage a consumer.
• Potential Long-Term Benefit: While the immediate process might be more complex, the change could lead to a healthier marketplace in the long run. By increasing the cost of poor quality for sellers, the policy shift may incentivize them to improve product standards and descriptions, potentially reducing the frequency of issues consumers encounter.⁸

For Sellers:

• Relief from Rampant Abuse: The most significant positive impact is the expected reduction in fraudulent “仅退款” claims that led to substantial “money and goods lost” scenarios. This should alleviate significant financial pressure and operational stress.⁴¹
• Increased Autonomy and Control: Sellers regain more direct control over handling after-sales disputes. They now have the opportunity to communicate directly with customers, understand the issue, and propose solutions (including standard return-for-refund) before the platform steps in.²
• Emphasis on Customer Service: With negotiation becoming central, sellers need effective communication and problem-solving skills to manage customer relationships and resolve disputes amicably to avoid negative reviews or platform escalation.⁴¹
• Operational Adjustments: Sellers need to adapt their workflows to manage potentially more complex negotiations and handle returns for items that might previously have been written off under “仅退款.”
• Potential Cost Increase (Specific Cases): For sellers in categories like fresh produce or extremely low-value goods, where “仅退款” might have been a genuinely efficient way to handle unavoidable quality issues or damage in transit, the shift could lead to increased costs if physical returns become more frequent.³⁸

Beyond these direct impacts, the policy change could subtly reshape consumer behavior. With the easy “refund only” safety net shrinking, shoppers might become more discerning, potentially favoring platforms and sellers known for reliability, quality, and responsive customer service.⁸ Trust, always important in e-commerce, may become an even more critical factor in purchasing decisions.

This shift also places a greater onus on the platforms themselves. Having transferred primary resolution responsibility back to sellers and buyers, platforms must now invest in building robust support systems. This includes providing clear guidelines for negotiation, fair and efficient mediation processes for when talks fail, and effective tools to identify and penalize bad actors – whether they be fraudulent buyers or unresponsive sellers.¹⁹ Failure to create these supporting frameworks could simply replace the old problems with new ones, leading to different forms of frustration within the ecosystem.

East vs. West: Comparing E-commerce Returns in China and the US

Understanding the significance of China’s “仅退款” reversal is aided by comparing it to typical e-commerce return practices in the United States, particularly on major platforms like Amazon and Walmart.

US Standard Practices (Overview):

• General Policy: US retailers generally allow returns for most items within a defined period, commonly 30 days for platforms like Amazon and Walmart for many product categories, although numerous exceptions exist (e.g., shorter windows for electronics, longer for some items, specific exclusions).⁴⁸ The key condition is usually that the item must be returned in its original or unused condition with packaging.⁴⁸
• Return Process: The standard expectation is that the consumer must physically return the item. Retailers facilitate this through various methods, including providing prepaid shipping labels, offering drop-off locations (like UPS stores for Amazon, or returning online orders to physical Walmart stores), or sometimes offering QR codes for label-free returns.⁴⁸
• Refund Timing: Typically, refunds are processed after the seller or retailer receives and inspects the returned item.⁴⁸ While processing times vary, it confirms the item has been returned correctly. Amazon sometimes offers faster refunds, potentially issuing credit upon the first scan at a drop-off point or carrier receipt, but reserves the right to recharge if the item isn’t received correctly.⁵⁴
• Returnless Refunds (US Context): This practice exists in the US but operates differently than China’s former “仅退款” standard. Amazon sellers, for instance, can choose to offer a returnless refund as one option for handling returns, often for low-value items where return shipping is prohibitive, or for hygiene reasons.⁴⁸ Amazon itself may issue them in specific cases. However, it’s generally a seller-discretionary tool or applies to specific product types, not a platform-wide, competitively driven default policy applied as broadly as China’s “仅退款” became.¹ The default expectation remains a physical return.
• Fees: Unlike the often fee-free “仅退款” in China, US returns can incur costs. Restocking fees may apply for items returned late, opened (especially software/games), damaged by the user, or missing parts.⁴⁸ Return shipping fees might also be deducted if the reason for return isn’t the seller’s fault and a free return option wasn’t used.⁴⁸
• Marketplace Sellers: Policies for third-party sellers on platforms like Amazon and Walmart can vary, but platforms generally mandate minimum standards. For example, sellers usually need a US-based return address, and Walmart requires marketplace sellers to offer at least a 30-day return window for most items.⁴⁸

Key Differences & Similarities:

The evolution in China brings its system closer to US norms in some respects, but significant differences remain, shaped by their distinct market histories.

Feature	China (Pre-April 2025 “仅退款” Era)	China (Post-April 2025 Changes)	Typical US (e.g., Amazon/Walmart)
Default for Refund (Quality Issue)?	Often “Refund Only” (platform-driven)	Negotiation first; Refund/Return likely default	Return for Refund
Return Required?	Often No (platform decision)	Negotiable; Likely Yes unless seller agrees otherwise	Generally Yes
Platform Intervention Level?	High, often automated & proactive	Low (“Non-essential non-intervention”), mediation role	Facilitator of return process; Mediation if dispute escalates
Seller Autonomy Level?	Low, often overridden by platform	Higher, primary role in negotiation	Moderate, subject to platform policies but generally handles returns
Primary Driver for Policy?	Intense platform competition (“内卷”), user acquisition/experience	Balancing ecosystem health, reducing abuse, regulatory pressure	Logistics efficiency, customer service norms, cost management
Common Abuse Type?	False claims for refund without return (“薅羊毛”, “0元购”)	TBD (potentially false claims during negotiation)	Wardrobing, returning used/damaged items, false defect claims
Refund Trigger?	Platform decision (often automated or quick)	Seller agreement or platform mediation decision after negotiation	Receipt and inspection of returned item (sometimes earlier scan)

Source: Synthesized from ¹-.¹

This comparison underscores how different market structures and competitive pressures can lead to vastly different consumer protection mechanisms. The US market, while competitive, saw return policies evolve more gradually based on established retail logistics and customer service standards. China’s uniquely fragmented and hyper-competitive e-commerce landscape ¹ fostered radical, consumer-skewed policies like “仅退款” as a powerful differentiation tactic, demonstrating how market-specific conditions can forge unique policy paths.

The rollback in China might also hint at a broader trend. As e-commerce markets mature globally, the extreme pro-consumer policies sometimes adopted during intense growth phases may be tempered. The problems China faced – widespread abuse, seller strain, ecosystem imbalance ¹⁵ – represent inherent risks in overly lenient systems. The shift back towards requiring negotiation, proof, and physical returns where appropriate ² mirrors principles underlying more established Western systems. This could suggest a global convergence towards more balanced and sustainable e-commerce practices that recognize the interdependence of consumer satisfaction and seller viability.⁸

Conclusion: Lessons from China’s Great E-commerce Policy Reversal

The journey of the “仅退款” policy in China offers a compelling narrative about the dynamics of modern digital marketplaces. Born from intense competition and a drive to capture consumer loyalty ¹, the “refund only” system provided unprecedented convenience for shoppers but ultimately proved unsustainable due to widespread abuse and the heavy burden it placed on sellers.¹⁵ Its coordinated rollback by China’s leading e-commerce platforms in April 2025 marks a significant recalibration.²

This policy reversal is more than just a technical adjustment to after-sales service rules. It signifies a potential maturation within China’s vibrant e-commerce sector, reflecting a necessary rebalancing of the intricate relationships between powerful platforms, hundreds of millions of consumers, and the vast army of merchants who form the backbone of the ecosystem.⁸ It’s a move away from the potentially damaging extremes fostered by “内卷” (involution) towards practices that aim for greater fairness and long-term stability.

For observers in the United States, the rise and fall of “仅退款” provides several key takeaways:

1. Unique Market Dynamics: China’s e-commerce landscape operates under distinct pressures and incentives, leading to the adoption and subsequent abandonment of policies that might seem alien in the US context. Understanding these differences is crucial for anyone engaging with or analyzing this market.
2. The Double-Edged Sword of Competition: While competition drives innovation and consumer benefits, hyper-competition can push platforms towards extreme measures with unforeseen negative consequences, potentially harming the very ecosystem they seek to dominate.
3. The Universal Balancing Act: The core challenge of fairly balancing the interests of consumers, sellers, and the platform itself is universal in e-commerce. China’s experience provides a large-scale case study of the difficulties and potential corrections involved in this ongoing process.
4. Platform Power and Regulation: The story highlights the immense power wielded by dominant e-commerce platforms in setting market rules and the potential role of regulatory scrutiny in prompting adjustments towards more equitable practices.

As e-commerce continues to evolve globally, the search for fair, efficient, and sustainable models remains paramount. China’s dramatic experiment with, and subsequent retreat from, the widespread “refund only” policy serves as a powerful reminder that prioritizing one side of the market too heavily can ultimately undermine the health of the whole. The focus now shifts to how effectively the new, negotiation-centric approach can foster a more balanced and resilient digital marketplace for the future.

引用的著作

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14. “仅退款”没有原罪，规则重构是关键 – 经济观察网, 访问时间为 四月 24, 2025， http://www.eeo.com.cn/2025/0423/723296.shtml
15. 部分“仅退款”变“0元购”成商家噩梦专家建议完善规则明确“仅退款”适用 …, 访问时间为 四月 24, 2025， http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/20240807/7d99adee32ae4d4b8d9719aed4778a6a/c.html
16. “仅退款”成电商平台标配滥用服务“薅羊毛”可能构成犯罪, 访问时间为 四月 24, 2025， https://content-static.cctvnews.cctv.com/snow-book/index.html?item_id=1041963844778089033&toc_style_id=feeds_default&module=ccnews%3A%2F%2Fappclient%2Fpage%2Ffeeds%2Fdetail%3Furl%3Dhttps%253A%252F%252Fcontent-static.cctvnews.cctv.com%252Fsnow-book%252Find
17. “仅退款”成了电商新主流：质疑拼多多，理解拼多多，成为拼多多 – 上观, 访问时间为 四月 24, 2025， https://m.jfdaily.com/wx/detail.do?id=699915
18. 消费者的福音还是商家噩梦？“仅退款”模式再探讨 – OFweek通信网, 访问时间为 四月 24, 2025， https://tele.ofweek.com/2024-08/ART-8320500-8400-30643471.html
19. 快手终止“退款不退货”，为何引发关注？ – 财经》客户端, 访问时间为 四月 24, 2025， https://www.mycaijing.com/article/detail/535881?source_id=40
20. 网购“仅退款”的背后，商家与消费者的天平如何平衡？ – 上观, 访问时间为 四月 24, 2025， https://www.jfdaily.com/wx/detail.do?id=828516
21. 1302篇判决书里的仅退款：“平台自治”走得太远了吗？ – 东方财富, 访问时间为 四月 24, 2025， https://finance.eastmoney.com/a/202501243307197720.html
22. “仅退款”已经完成历史使命 – OFweek通信网, 访问时间为 四月 24, 2025， https://tele.ofweek.com/2024-08/ART-8320506-8110-30642198.html
23. 【e公司观察】 “仅退款”退出电商历史舞台在规范中重塑行业生态, 访问时间为 四月 24, 2025， https://stcn.com/article/detail/1689525.html
24. “仅退款”，即将谢幕！消费者申请将由商家自主处理 – 财经网, 访问时间为 四月 24, 2025， http://economy.caijing.com.cn/20250423/5085680.shtml
25. 人民热评：“仅退款”退场，该如何“善后”？ – 人民网, 访问时间为 四月 24, 2025， http://opinion.people.com.cn/n1/2025/0423/c436867-40466520.html
26. 仅退款，惹到谁了？ – 投中网, 访问时间为 四月 24, 2025， https://www.chinaventure.com.cn/news/78-20240112-379246.html
27. 防止恶意薅羊毛电商平台优化“仅退款” – 新华网, 访问时间为 四月 24, 2025， http://www.xinhuanet.com/fortune/20240802/a144354d871443eba50bd222968af7c5/c.html
28. 被逼疯的商家，起诉了4000多个“羊毛党” – 证券时报, 访问时间为 四月 24, 2025， http://stcn.com/article/detail/1278167.html
29. 恶意“零元购”频现，如何防止仅退款被玩坏？ – 新华网, 访问时间为 四月 24, 2025， http://www.news.cn/legal/20240729/a9e3c201315447abbe2a6e4d782182fc/c.html
30. 618前，「仅退款」的168天 – 投中网, 访问时间为 四月 24, 2025， https://m.chinaventure.com.cn/news/78-20240614-381533.html
31. 记者观察：“仅退款”谢幕电商平台要重新拥抱常识 – 证券时报, 访问时间为 四月 24, 2025， https://www.stcn.com/article/detail/1690187.html
32. 【e公司观察】“双11”大促正式收官电商平台从低价“内卷”迈向品质竞争 – 证券时报, 访问时间为 四月 24, 2025， http://stcn.com/article/detail/1410014.html
33. “仅退款”规则为何成头部电商服务标配 – 人民日报, 访问时间为 四月 24, 2025， http://paper.people.com.cn/zgcsb/html/2024-01/01/content_26034614.htm
34. 电商困于退货率 – OFweek通信网, 访问时间为 四月 24, 2025， https://tele.ofweek.com/2023-03/ART-8320506-8420-30591256.html
35. 滥用“仅退款”规则“薅羊毛”？法院：不诚信行为应受惩戒 – 南方网, 访问时间为 四月 24, 2025， https://news.southcn.com/node_833d8801be/22eeec1baf.shtml
36. “仅退款”当作“零元购”？这种“羊毛”薅不得 – 证券时报, 访问时间为 四月 24, 2025， https://www.stcn.com/article/detail/1177387.html
37. “仅退款”变“0元购”成商家噩梦，电商平台退款规则亟待完善 – 新华网, 访问时间为 四月 24, 2025， http://www.news.cn/digital/20240807/d2dda4e17f0e46b8812850217c385c1e/c.html
38. 多家电商平台将全面取消“仅退款” 退款不退货谁说了算？ – 中国日报网, 访问时间为 四月 24, 2025， https://cn.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202504/23/WS6808dfb1a310f54263474090.html
39. 网购后“仅退款不退货”引发“官司” 法官：消费者网上购物要以诚信为本 – 雅安市, 访问时间为 四月 24, 2025， https://www.yaan.gov.cn/credit/staticPage/0bfc8889-3bf8-4c2e-b71c-0d575940e381.html
40. 网购后仅退款不退货？切莫如此“薅羊毛” – 河南省高级人民法院, 访问时间为 四月 24, 2025， https://www.hncourt.gov.cn/public/detail.php?id=199334
41. “电商平台全面取消仅退款”上热搜 – 观察者, 访问时间为 四月 24, 2025， https://www.guancha.cn/economy/2025_04_23_773343.shtml
42. 外媒：儘管無優勢習近平擬與美國打大範圍持久戰| 兩岸 – 中央社, 访问时间为 四月 24, 2025， https://www.cna.com.tw/news/acn/202504160322.aspx
43. 特斯拉Q1獲利大跌馬斯克稱5月起將投入更多時間| 國際| 中央社CNA, 访问时间为 四月 24, 2025， https://www.cna.com.tw/news/aopl/202504230027.aspx
44. 取消“仅退款” 电商平台用行动反内卷 – 证券时报, 访问时间为 四月 24, 2025， https://www.stcn.com/article/detail/1691651.html
45. “仅退款”，即将谢幕！ – 证券时报, 访问时间为 四月 24, 2025， https://www.stcn.com/article/detail/1687310.html
46. 电商“仅退款”取消后：商家会滥用自主权吗？消费者维权指南 – 新浪新闻, 访问时间为 四月 24, 2025， https://news.sina.com.cn/zx/2025-04-24/doc-ineufhci3238719.shtml?cre=tianyi&mod=pchp&loc=33&r=0&rfunc=82&tj=cxvertical_pc_hp&tr=12
47. 2025淘天惠商举措集中公布- 淘宝教育, 访问时间为 四月 24, 2025， https://daxue.taobao.com/information/detail.jhtml?id=421
48. Amazon Return Policy – Amazon Customer Service, 访问时间为 四月 24, 2025， https://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/display.html?nodeId=GKM69DUUYKQWKWX7
49. Amazon.com: : All Departments, 访问时间为 四月 24, 2025， https://www.amazon.com/b?ie=UTF8&node=18726306011
50. Amazon.com: Help / Shipping & Returns / Returns / Returns Policy, 访问时间为 四月 24, 2025， https://www.columbia.edu/~mr2651/ecommerce3/1st/assignments/amazon%20return.htm
51. Walmart Standard Return Policy, 访问时间为 四月 24, 2025， https://www.walmart.com/help/article/walmart-standard-return-policy/adc0dfb692954e67a4de206fb8d9e03a
52. Free Returns | Walmart.com, 访问时间为 四月 24, 2025， https://www.walmart.com/cp/returns/1231920
53. Walmart’s Return Policy This April: Returns With & Without A Receipt – DealNews, 访问时间为 四月 24, 2025， https://www.dealnews.com/features/walmart/return-policy/
54. Amazon Refund Timelines – Amazon Customer Service, 访问时间为 四月 24, 2025， https://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/display.html?nodeId=GKQNFKFK5CF3C54B
55. Refunds – Walmart.com, 访问时间为 四月 24, 2025， https://www.walmart.com/help/article/refunds/a86a0400e237444cb9a5f3c3ce500d1b

Returns policy – Guides | Marketplace Learn – Walmart, 访问时间为 四月 24, 2025， https://marketplacelearn.walmart.com/guides/Order%20management/Returns%20&%20refunds/returns-policy