Anjoy Foods: How China’s Frozen Food King Conquered the Market

The air is thick with steam and the scent of Sichuan peppercorns, a fragrant cloud rising from a bubbling, crimson cauldron at the center of the table. Around it, friends and family are a flurry of motion, chopsticks dipping and retrieving treasures from the boiling broth: paper-thin slices of lamb that cook in seconds, bouncy fish balls, and delicate folds of tofu skin. This is hot pot (火锅, huǒguō), and in China, it’s far more than just a meal. It is a social ritual, a cornerstone of community, a culinary tradition with roots stretching back centuries to the days of emperors, yet perfectly adapted to the fast-paced pulse of modern life.¹ From the fiery, numbing broths of Chongqing to the clear, mutton-focused pots of Beijing, hot pot is the default choice for celebrations, business dinners, and casual get-togethers, a symbol of shared experience and communal warmth.³

As diners debate the merits of a particular restaurant’s broth or the freshness of its hand-sliced beef, few give a second thought to the anonymous pucks of frozen shrimp paste or the perfectly uniform beef rolls that fill their bowls. Yet, behind this vast, nationwide culinary phenomenon stands an invisible giant, a company that has quietly become the undisputed king of China’s frozen food industry. That company is Anjoy Foods (安井食品, Ānjǐng Shípǐn).⁵

With a commanding 6.6% share of the entire Chinese frozen food market, Anjoy is the silent, ubiquitous force powering countless meals.⁶ In the critical hot pot ingredients segment—what the industry calls frozen prepared foods—its dominance is absolute, holding a market share nearly five times that of its closest competitor.⁶ It is a behemoth built not on flashy technology or a viral brand, but on a foundation of relentless operational grit.

This raises a compelling question. How did a company founded as late as 2001, helmed by a former university professor with no background in food science, manage to outmaneuver established industry titans and grow into a multi-billion-dollar empire built on the humble fish ball?⁵ And why is this giant, at the peak of its power and sitting on a mountain of cash, now facing a shareholder rebellion, slowing growth, and an uncertain future as it makes a controversial bid for global expansion?⁹ The story of Anjoy Foods is the story of modern China’s business landscape itself: a tale of brilliant strategy, audacious pivots, and the complex challenges that come with conquering a market of 1.4 billion people.

Part I: The Professor’s Gambit: Trading the ‘Iron Rice Bowl’ for a Rolling Pin

The architect of this frozen food empire is an unlikely figure. Liu Mingming, born in 1962, is a native of Henan province, a region often considered the cradle of Chinese civilization and known for its deep historical roots and resilient people.⁸ He began his career not in a boardroom, but in a classroom. With a bachelor’s degree, he secured a teaching position in the civil engineering department at a university in Zhengzhou, the provincial capital.¹¹

For an American audience to grasp the magnitude of his later decisions, one must first understand the concept of the “iron rice bowl” (铁饭碗, tiě fànwǎn). For decades in China, this term represented the pinnacle of professional security: a stable, lifelong job with guaranteed benefits, typically within a state-owned enterprise or the academic system. It was a promise of cradle-to-grave security, a stark contrast to the turbulent decades that preceded the country’s economic reforms. To voluntarily give up an iron rice bowl in the 1980s or 90s was a radical, almost unthinkable act. It meant trading absolute certainty for the wild, unpredictable frontier of private enterprise.

Yet, that is precisely what Liu Mingming did. In the 1980s, as Deng Xiaoping’s reforms began to unleash the country’s latent economic energy, Liu felt a powerful pull. He was driven by a simple, yet profound, desire to “go out and see the world”.⁸ He left the hallowed halls of academia and plunged into the nascent world of Chinese business, taking on roles as a department manager at a leasing company and later in the real estate sector.¹¹ This period of exploration gave him a diverse business education that would prove invaluable.

In December 2001, Liu made his definitive move, establishing a food company in the coastal city of Xiamen, Fujian province. It was initially called Xiamen Huashun Minsheng Foods Co., Ltd., the entity that would eventually be renamed Anjoy Foods in 2011.⁵

His timing, however, seemed poor. Anjoy was a latecomer to a fiercely competitive game. The frozen food market, particularly for staples like dumplings (jiǎozi) and wontons (húntun), was already dominated by two northern giants, Sanquan Foods and Synear Food. These companies were household names, their products fixtures in supermarket freezers across the country. Anjoy’s initial attempts to compete head-on in this crowded space were a struggle. The company was small, unknown, and fighting for survival against deeply entrenched incumbents.¹⁵ It was clear that if Anjoy was to survive, let alone thrive, it could not play by the same rules as its rivals. It needed a different path, a new strategy. Liu Mingming, the professor-turned-entrepreneur, was about to give the market its first lesson in the art of the pivot.

The journey of Liu Mingming is more than just a founder’s biography; it serves as a perfect microcosm of China’s staggering economic transformation over the past four decades. His personal decision to shatter his own “iron rice bowl” in pursuit of entrepreneurial opportunity mirrors the national narrative of a country moving away from a rigid, planned economy toward a dynamic, market-driven one. It was this societal-level shift in values, this embrace of risk and ambition, that created the conditions for a company like Anjoy to be born and, eventually, to conquer.

Part II: The Art of the Pivot: A Masterclass in Corporate Strategy

Facing overwhelming odds, Anjoy Foods didn’t try to outmuscle its competitors. Instead, it chose to outthink them. The company’s rise is a case study in a uniquely Chinese approach to business strategy, built on pragmatism, operational excellence, and a series of brilliantly executed pivots.

The First Pivot: Differentiated Competition and the ‘Big Single Product’

Realizing it couldn’t win a direct fight over dumplings, Anjoy adopted a strategy the Chinese call cuòwèi jìngzhēng (错位竞争), or “differentiated competition”.¹⁵ The logic was simple: don’t fight where the enemy is strongest. Instead of the fiercely contested supermarket freezer aisle, Anjoy targeted the channels its bigger rivals often overlooked: smaller cities and the bustling, chaotic wholesale agricultural markets that supply countless small restaurants and food stalls.¹⁵

More importantly, they changed the product. Anjoy sidestepped the dumpling wars and focused on a less glamorous but high-volume niche: frozen fermented products. This included items like steamed buns (mántou) and, most crucially, the hand-grabbed pancake (shǒu zhuā bǐng), a flaky, savory flatbread popular for breakfast.¹⁷

This move was coupled with what would become Anjoy’s signature weapon: the “big single product” (dà dānpǐn) strategy. Rather than diluting its efforts across a wide portfolio, the company focused its entire might on creating massive, category-defining hits. The hand-grabbed pancake was a prime example. Anjoy concentrated on just two core flavors—original and scallion—to cover the vast majority of consumer preferences. This narrow focus allowed for tremendous economies of scale in production and procurement, driving down costs and enabling Anjoy to offer an unbeatable price-performance ratio.¹⁷ Soon, distributors and street-side food vendors found Anjoy’s pancakes to be the most reliable and profitable choice, cementing the company’s position in the segment. This strategy was in Anjoy’s DNA from the very beginning. In its founding year of 2001, a single blockbuster product, the frozen pumpkin pie, accounted for a staggering 5 million RMB in sales, representing over 21% of the company’s total revenue.¹⁵ By 2023, this approach had been scaled to incredible heights, with Anjoy boasting 37 distinct “big single products” that each generated over 100 million RMB (about $14 million) in annual revenue.⁷

The Second, Decisive Pivot: Conquering the Hot Pot Nation

The success in fermented products gave Anjoy a vital lifeline and a foundation to build upon. But Liu Mingming recognized its limitations. In 2007, he orchestrated the company’s second, and most decisive, pivot: a full-scale assault on the frozen hot pot ingredients market.¹⁷

The timing was perfect. The hot pot trend was exploding across China, but the market for its core ingredients—fish balls, meat balls, shrimp paste, and other surimi-based products—was highly fragmented, with no clear leader. It was a high-growth sector with better profit margins than basic noodle and rice products. Anjoy was perfectly positioned to capitalize on this. Its headquarters in Fujian province, a coastal region with a rich fishing industry, provided a natural advantage in sourcing raw materials for surimi products.¹⁷

Anjoy applied its proven playbook to this new battlefield. It used aggressive pricing to rapidly gain market share and focused on creating blockbuster products like its signature fish tofu and chive dumplings. The result was a stunning success. Anjoy’s market share in frozen hot pot ingredients soared, solidifying its position as the new king of the category and paving the way for its 2017 IPO on the Shanghai Stock Exchange.⁵

Building the Moat: Channels and Production

Underpinning these strategic pivots were two powerful operational pillars that formed Anjoy’s competitive moat.

First was its “channel is king” philosophy. Anjoy’s primary goal was not to become the number one brand in the mind of the end consumer, but to be the number one brand for the thousands of distributors who form the backbone of China’s food supply chain.¹⁸ The company built a vast network that today includes over 2,000 primary distributors.⁶ It didn’t just sell to them; it partnered with them. Anjoy developed a unique “close support” (

tiēshēn zhīchí) model, where its teams would actively help distributors expand their businesses, whether that meant getting products into local supermarkets or even setting up online live-streaming sales channels.²⁰ This deep-seated partnership created immense loyalty and a formidable distribution machine.

Second was its “sales-based production” (xiāo dì chǎn) strategy. To support its sprawling distributor network and keep costs brutally low, Anjoy embarked on an aggressive nationwide expansion of its production footprint. Instead of shipping products from a central factory, Anjoy built 12 massive production bases strategically located near its key sales regions across China, from Liaoning in the northeast to Sichuan in the southwest.⁵ This model drastically reduced logistics costs—a major expense for frozen goods—and allowed the company to respond much more quickly to regional tastes and market demands.²⁰

Anjoy’s story is a triumph of pragmatic, operational excellence over disruptive technological innovation. The company didn’t invent a new gadget or create an entirely new market. It took existing, often commoditized, product categories and won through superior strategy and flawless execution. Its model is a masterclass in supply chain management and distribution, proving that in a vast, complex, and price-sensitive market like China, how you make and move a product can be far more important than the product itself.

Phase	Time Period	Core Strategy	Key Products/Markets	Outcome
Survival Phase	2001-2006	Differentiated Competition (cuòwèi jìngzhēng)	Fermented Products (Pumpkin Pie, Hand-Grabbed Pancakes), Wholesale Markets	Gained a foothold, established initial brand and channel presence.
Breakthrough Phase	2007-2016	All-in on Hot Pot Ingredients	Fish Balls, Meatballs, Surimi Products; Distributor Channels	Became the leader in the high-growth hot pot segment, prepared for IPO.
Expansion & Diversification	2017-Present	“Three Swords Combined” & “BC Coexistence”	Hot Pot Ingredients, Rice/Noodle Products, Pre-Prepared Meals; B2B & B2C Channels	Became industry’s first 10B RMB company, launched “second startup.”

Part III: The ‘Second Startup’: Conquering the Pre-Prepared Meal Frontier

Having conquered the hot pot table, Anjoy set its sights on the entire kitchen. Around 2018, the company embarked on what it internally calls its “second startup”: a major push into the burgeoning world of pre-prepared meals, or yùzhìcài (预制菜).¹⁷

For an American audience, the term yuzhicai requires some explanation. It’s a broad category that goes far beyond the frozen TV dinners of old. It encompasses a massive ecosystem of food products at various stages of preparation: ready-to-cook (cleaned and chopped ingredients with sauce packets), ready-to-heat (fully cooked meals needing only a microwave), and ready-to-eat. This trend is exploding in China, fueled by a confluence of social and economic factors: the frantic pace of urban life, the rise of the “lazy economy” (lǎnrén jīngjì), the ubiquity of food delivery apps, and a restaurant industry desperate to cut costs and standardize quality.¹⁶ This isn’t a niche market; it’s a colossal industry. By 2023, China’s pre-prepared meal market was estimated to be worth over 500 billion RMB (approximately $70 billion) and growing at a blistering pace.²⁴

Anjoy was an early mover. It formally added pre-prepared dishes to its portfolio as a third strategic pillar in 2018, alongside its hot pot ingredients and rice/noodle products.¹⁷ The bet paid off handsomely. By 2022, revenue from this new segment had surged to 3 billion RMB, accounting for roughly a quarter of the company’s total sales.¹⁸

To conquer this new frontier, Anjoy deployed a clever, de-risked replication of its original playbook, attacking the market with a two-pronged strategy.

First, for established and highly popular pre-prepared categories where it was a latecomer, Anjoy used its immense capital to simply buy its way to the top. The most prominent example is crayfish. Pre-cooked spicy crayfish is a national obsession in China. Instead of starting from scratch, Anjoy went on an acquisition spree. It took control of Hubei-based Xinhongye Foods and later acquired a majority stake in another major processor, Xinliuwo Group.¹⁷ These bold moves, centered in Hubei province—the heartland of China’s crayfish industry—instantly transformed Anjoy into a dominant national player in one of the most lucrative pre-prepared food segments.

Second, for newer, more speculative consumer-facing products, Anjoy adopted a more cautious, asset-light approach to test the waters. It launched new sub-brands like “Dongpin Xiansheng” (冻品先生, Mr. Frozen) and “Anjoy Xiaochu” (安井小厨, Anjoy Little Chef). These brands often use an OEM (Original Equipment Manufacturer) model, outsourcing production to third-party factories to minimize risk and cost.¹⁷ This allows them to rapidly launch and test a variety of products, like kits for sour fish soup (

suāncài yú) or bags of pre-fried crispy pork (xiǎo sū ròu), without committing to massive capital expenditure. If a product proves to be a hit and has the potential to become the next “big single product,” Anjoy can then leverage its core strength and shift production to its own massive, highly efficient factories to scale up.¹⁷

This dual strategy is tailored to the different needs of the market. For its business-to-business (B2B) clients, like restaurant chains, Anjoy focuses on providing standardized, consistent, and cost-effective semi-finished ingredients that improve kitchen efficiency.²⁸ For its business-to-consumer (C2C) products, the goal is to provide a complete “lazy” meal solution—a convenient, tasty, and easy-to-prepare dish that saves the consumer time and effort.²⁷ Anjoy’s entire

yuzhicai strategy is a masterclass in disciplined growth: using acquisitions to dominate proven markets while using an agile, low-cost incubation model to discover the next big thing. It’s not a risky gamble; it’s a systematic, well-funded application of a winning formula to a new, high-growth arena.

Part IV: Growing Pains: A Controversial IPO and a Wary Market

Despite its commanding market position and a history of spectacular growth, Anjoy Foods now finds itself at a difficult crossroads. The company that could seemingly do no wrong is facing a potent combination of slowing growth, intense competition, and a deeply controversial strategic move that has alienated a significant portion of its investor base.

The trouble began in January 2024, when Anjoy shocked the market with an announcement: it planned to pursue a secondary listing on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange to issue H-shares.⁹ The stated purpose was to accelerate the company’s international strategy, enhance its overseas financing capabilities, and build a global brand.²⁹

The reaction from its existing A-share investors in Shanghai was swift and brutal. The news was seen not as a sign of ambitious expansion, but as a betrayal. On the first trading day after the announcement, Anjoy’s stock price plummeted by the 10% daily limit. The sell-off continued for over a week, wiping out more than 20% of the company’s market value.⁹ When the Hong Kong IPO finally took place in July 2025, the debut was weak, with the stock closing down 5% on its first day of trading.³¹

The source of the investor fury can be summed up in two words: “money grab.” In Chinese online stock forums, investors accused the company of quānqián (圈钱), a colloquial term for raising capital without a legitimate need, often to the detriment of existing shareholders.¹⁰ Their anger was fueled by several key facts.

First, Anjoy was in no way short on cash. As of late 2023, the company was sitting on a war chest of over 5 billion RMB (about $700 million) in cash and cash equivalents.⁹ Furthermore, it still had roughly 1.7 billion RMB in unused funds from a previous定向增发 (private placement) that it had put into wealth management products.¹⁰ With a healthy balance sheet and minimal debt, investors saw no logical reason for the company to dilute their ownership by issuing new shares.

Second, the official justification of “internationalization” struck many as flimsy and unconvincing. For all its talk of global ambition, Anjoy’s overseas business has been, and remains, negligible. For the past three years, revenue from outside mainland China has consistently hovered at a mere 1% of its total sales.⁹ Its only significant overseas asset is a small UK-based company called Kungfu Foods, acquired in 2021. This international business is not only tiny but also far less profitable, with gross margins significantly lower than its domestic operations, partly due to high logistics costs.¹⁰

The discontent boiled over into an open revolt. At the shareholder meeting convened to approve the Hong Kong listing, an astonishing 60.5% of voting small and medium-sized shareholders cast their ballots against the plan.¹⁰ It was a powerful protest vote, though ultimately futile. The company’s management, with the backing of its large institutional shareholders, pushed the resolution through.

This controversy is unfolding against a backdrop of deteriorating performance. After years of blistering, double-digit growth, Anjoy’s engine is sputtering. As the table below shows, revenue and profit growth slowed dramatically in 2024 and turned negative for the first time in the first quarter of 2025.³² The company is also facing increasing consumer complaints on platforms like Black Cat about food quality issues, such as foreign objects and mold found in its products, which threaten its C-end brand image.³⁵

Period	Revenue (Billion RMB)	Revenue Growth (YoY)	Net Profit (Billion RMB)	Net Profit Growth (YoY)
FY 2022	12.18	31.3%	1.10	62.8%
FY 2023	14.12	15.9%	1.12	1.8%
FY 2024	15.13	7.7%	1.49	33.0%
Q1 2025	3.60	-4.1%	0.40	-10.0%
Data compiled from sources.6

For its part, Anjoy’s management has defended its decision. Chairman Liu Mingming has argued that the Hong Kong listing is a crucial long-term strategic move. He contends that an H-share platform provides a much more flexible and efficient way to raise international capital (particularly U.S. dollars) for potential overseas mergers and acquisitions. It allows the company to bypass China’s complex and time-consuming capital control procedures for moving large sums of money abroad, ensuring they can act quickly when a strategic opportunity arises.²⁹

This clash exposes a deep fissure between corporate ambition and investor reality. Anjoy’s management is playing a long-term global chess game, preparing for a future of international expansion that may be years away. Its A-share retail investors, however, are focused on the immediate picture: a cash-rich company with slowing domestic growth that is diluting their stake to fund a vague overseas dream that has, so far, shown little promise. The controversy is more than just a dispute over capital allocation; it’s a fundamental disagreement about the future of the company and the best path to creating value.

Conclusion: The King’s Next Course

The story of Anjoy Foods is a testament to a uniquely Chinese model of entrepreneurial success. It is the story of a professor who traded a life of academic certainty for the chaos of the market and built a food empire. His victory was forged not in a lab with a breakthrough invention, but on the factory floor and in the distribution networks, through a relentless focus on pragmatic strategy, operational grit, and an uncanny ability to pivot at precisely the right moment. Anjoy mastered the art of winning in a commoditized market, proving that scale, efficiency, and channel dominance can be the most powerful innovations of all.

Today, this frozen food king stands at a critical juncture. Its core domestic market, while still enormous, is maturing. The explosive growth of the past is giving way to tougher, more incremental gains against a rising tide of competitors. Its “second startup” in the world of pre-prepared meals holds immense promise but also faces significant headwinds, from fickle consumer tastes to the same fierce competition that defines the rest of China’s food industry.

The controversial Hong Kong IPO has laid bare the central question facing the company. Can the “Anjoy Way”—the battle-tested formula of cost leadership, channel supremacy, and the “big single product”—be exported to the rest of the world? Or was the shareholder revolt an early warning sign that the company, in its quest for global glory, is losing touch with the very market that made it a titan? As Anjoy looks to the future, the world is watching to see what its next course will be: a grand global banquet, or a more modest, but perhaps more satisfying, domestic meal.

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