Mingming Hen Mang IPO: China’s Discount Snack Giant Eyes Hong Kong Listing

Hey everyone, your friendly neighborhood American expat here, reporting live from the front lines of China’s ever-evolving consumer landscape. If you’ve walked down almost any busy street in a Chinese city lately – or even ventured into the smaller towns and counties – you’ve probably noticed them: brightly lit stores, often yellow or red, overflowing with snacks of every imaginable kind, all promising one thing: low prices.

These aren’t your typical convenience stores or supermarkets. They belong to a relatively new breed of retailer known here as Liangfan Lingshi (量贩零食), which roughly translates to “bulk-buy discount snacks.” Think Costco meets your childhood candy store, but focused entirely on chips, chocolates, crackers, dried meats, sodas, and countless other treats, often sold loose by weight or in multi-packs at prices that make you do a double-take.

And right now, the undisputed king of this rapidly expanding empire is a company called Mingming Hen Mang (鸣鸣很忙 – literally “Mingming is Very Busy”). You might not know the parent company name yet, but you’ve almost certainly seen its two powerhouse brands: Ling Shi Hen Mang (零食很忙 – “Snacks Are Very Busy,” often sporting a bright yellow storefront) and Zhao Yi Ming Ling Shi (赵一鸣零食 – “Zhao Yiming Snacks,” typically decked out in red).

These two, once fierce rivals, joined forces in late 2023 to create a snack behemoth. How big? Try over 14,300 stores blanketing 28 provinces by the end of 2024. They pulled in a staggering ¥55.5 billion (around $7.9 billion USD) in gross merchandise volume (GMV) last year alone, serving over 1.6 billion customer transactions. Let that sink in – 1.6 billion.

Now, this snack juggernaut is knocking on the door of the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. On April 28th, 2025, Mingming Hen Mang officially filed its IPO prospectus, signaling its intent to go public, according to reports from outlets like Investment Community – Tian Tian IPO. This isn’t just another listing; it’s potentially the biggest consumer IPO of the year in this sector and a fascinating case study in how to win big in modern China.

So, grab a snack (you might feel inspired after reading this), and let’s unpack the story of Mingming Hen Mang: how two young entrepreneurs built empires from scratch, why the discount model exploded, the dramatic merger that reshaped the industry, and what this IPO means for the future of snacks and retail in China.

From Humble Beginnings: The Millennial Founders Who Saw an Opportunity

Every empire has its origin story, and Mingming Hen Mang’s tale features two protagonists, both relatively young entrepreneurs who spotted a gap in the market and seized it.

First, there’s Yan Zhou (晏周). Born after 1985 (the specific year isn’t usually disclosed for Chinese entrepreneurs, a common cultural nuance), Yan hails from Changsha, the capital of Hunan province. If Changsha rings a bell, it should – it’s become a veritable incubator for trendy consumer brands in China, birthing viral sensations like tea chain Cha Yan Yue Se (茶颜悦色) and crayfish hotspot Wen He You (文和友). Before diving into snacks, Yan Zhou cut his teeth in the real estate sector, working in marketing and planning for years.

Around 2016, he sensed an opportunity. He noticed that while China had plenty of snack options, most dedicated snack stores catered to the mid-to-high end market. The vast majority of consumers, particularly outside the biggest Tier 1 cities, were looking for value – what the Chinese call zhi jiabi (质价比), a crucial concept meaning a high quality-to-price ratio. They wanted good snacks without breaking the bank.

So, in March 2017, Yan Zhou and a few partners pooled together a modest sum (reportedly just over ¥100,000, or about $14,000 USD) and opened their first Ling Shi Hen Mang store in Changsha, as detailed by 21CBR. It was a tiny space, less than 40 square meters (about 430 sq ft). The concept was simple: offer a wide variety of popular snacks at noticeably lower prices than supermarkets. After a challenging start, the model proved popular, and they began expanding, initially through franchising, primarily within their home province of Hunan.

Meanwhile, about 500 kilometers (300 miles) away in Yichun, a city in neighboring Jiangxi province, another young entrepreneur was embarking on a similar path. Zhao Ding (赵定), born in 1989 in Anhui province but operating out of Jiangxi, came from a different background. According to his company’s history, he started learning the chao huo (炒货 – roasted nuts and seeds) business with his parents back in 2008. By 2015, he had opened his own bulk snack store in Jiangxi called “Shazi Guazi” (傻子瓜子 – “Fool’s Melon Seeds,” a nod to a famous historical brand). While it saw initial success, an early attempt at franchising faltered, teaching Zhao a valuable lesson: for a brand to succeed, the franchisees must make money.

Learning from this experience, Zhao Ding regrouped. In January 2019, he launched Zhao Yi Ming Ling Shi, naming the brand after his son, symbolizing his commitment to nurturing it. He spent the next couple of years meticulously refining the single-store model, focusing on efficiency and franchisee profitability. His explicit goal? To become the “Mixue Bingcheng of snacks,” a comparison noted by 36Kr Future Consumer.

For my American readers, Mixue Bingcheng (蜜雪冰城) is a cultural phenomenon here. It’s a budget ice cream and tea chain famous for its incredibly low prices (like ¥4 ice cream cones, about $0.57 USD), catchy theme song, and ubiquitous presence, especially in smaller cities and towns. It achieved massive scale through franchising and ruthless cost control. Zhao Ding saw the potential to apply a similar playbook to the snack market.

By 2020, Zhao Yi Ming Ling Shi was ready for prime time and began aggressively expanding via franchising, primarily targeting the xia chen shichang (下沉市场) – literally the “sinking market,” a term referring to China’s lower-tier cities (Tier 3 and below), counties, and towns. This vast market, often overlooked by premium brands, was proving hungry for affordable, quality goods.

Why Discount Snacks Took Off: Tapping into the Zeitgeist

The explosive growth of Ling Shi Hen Mang and Zhao Yi Ming Ling Shi wasn’t just down to smart founders; they were riding a powerful wave in Chinese consumer sentiment. Several factors converged to create the perfect storm for the Liangfan Lingshi model:

1. The Quest for Value (Zhi Jia Bi): After years of rapid economic growth and rising consumerism, recent years have seen a shift towards more rational consumption. People are still spending, but they’re increasingly focused on getting the most bang for their buck. The Liangfan stores, offering branded snacks at prices reportedly 25-30% lower than traditional supermarkets according to TMTPost, directly addressed this demand. They became an antidote to the “snack assassins” – outrageously priced items like ¥66 ($9.40) ice creams or ¥120/jin ($17 per half-kilo) dried plums that had caused sticker shock and social media outrage.
2. The Appeal of Variety and Discovery: These stores aren’t just cheap; they’re treasure troves. A typical Mingming Hen Mang outlet stocks at least 1,800 different SKUs (Stock Keeping Units), with the company managing over 3,380 SKUs in its central inventory. This is often double the snack selection of a similar-sized supermarket. They constantly rotate stock, adding around 100 new products each month. This turns shopping into an experience of discovery, encouraging impulse buys and frequent visits. The popularity of san cheng (散称 – selling loose by weight) for items like candies, chocolates, and dried snacks allows customers to mix and match small quantities, further lowering the barrier to trying new things.
3. Penetrating the Underserved “Sinking Market”: As mentioned, both brands heavily targeted lower-tier cities and towns. These areas often lacked the diverse retail options found in major metropolises. Supermarkets might have limited selections, and local mom-and-pop stores couldn’t compete on price or variety. Liangfan stores filled this void, bringing affordable “snack freedom” (lingshi ziyou), a term highlighted in recent analyses to millions who previously didn’t have easy access to such a wide range of treats. Mingming Hen Mang’s prospectus highlights this: by the end of 2024, about 69% of their stores were in Tier 3 cities and below, and 58% were located in county seats and towns, covering an impressive 66% of all counties in China.
4. The Power of Franchising: The franchise model allowed for incredibly rapid scaling. Entrepreneurs across the country saw the success of the early stores and jumped at the chance to open their own. The relatively low initial investment (around ¥600,000 or $85,000 for a 150 sq meter Ling Shi Hen Mang store, according to one report) and the promise of strong operational support made it an attractive proposition. This created a virtuous cycle: more stores meant more buying power, leading to lower costs, better prices, higher sales, and thus attracting even more franchisees.

The growth was phenomenal. According to iMedia Research (艾媒咨询), the number of Liangfan Lingshi stores in China ballooned from roughly 2,500 at the end of 2021 to potentially hitting 45,000 by the end of 2025. Ling Shi Hen Mang and Zhao Yi Ming were at the forefront of this explosion.

The Snack Wars and the Power Merger

As both Ling Shi Hen Mang and Zhao Yi Ming Ling Shi rapidly expanded, their paths inevitably crossed. By 2023, they were locked in fierce competition, often opening stores directly opposite each other on the same street. Observers noted县城 (xian cheng – county towns) where a single street might boast six or seven competing discount snack shops.

This rivalry escalated into intense price wars. To grab market share and undercut competitors, discounts became aggressive, sometimes reportedly hitting wu zhe (五折 – 50% off). While great for consumers in the short term, this race to the bottom was unsustainable, eroding profits for both the brands and their franchisees.

Zhao Ding himself acknowledged the destructive nature of the conflict, stating in an interview around that time, “If we fight, everyone loses. There are no winners.”

Recognizing the mutually assured destruction, the two rivals did something increasingly common in China’s hyper-competitive tech and consumer sectors: they decided to merge. In November 2023, Ling Shi Hen Mang and Zhao Yi Ming Ling Shi announced a strategic merger. At the time, their combined network already exceeded 6,500 stores.

The merger created the undisputed leader in the discount snack space. The new entity was eventually named Mingming Hen Mang Group. Yan Zhou took the helm as Chairman and CEO, while Zhao Ding became Vice Chairman and Deputy General Manager. They opted to maintain both the “Ling Shi Hen Mang” and “Zhao Yi Ming Ling Shi” brands, leveraging their existing recognition while integrating operations behind the scenes.

The synergy was clear: end the costly price war, combine purchasing power for even greater leverage with suppliers, streamline logistics and operations, and present a unified front to consolidate market leadership.

The merger wasn’t entirely smooth sailing. In January 2025, the State Administration for Market Regulation (SAMR), China’s antitrust watchdog, fined Mingming Hen Mang ¥1.75 million (about $250,000 USD) for failing to declare the merger for review beforehand (“failure to lawfully declare concentration of undertakings”). However, the regulator determined the merger itself didn’t restrict competition, essentially giving it a retroactive green light while penalizing the procedural lapse.

With the merger complete and regulatory hurdles cleared, the combined entity kicked its growth into hyperdrive. In just over a year following the merger announcement, they added nearly 8,000 stores, reaching that massive 14,394 figure by the end of 2024.

The Secret Sauce: How Mingming Hen Mang Delivers Low Prices

So, how does Mingming Hen Mang manage to sell snacks so much cheaper than everyone else while still (presumably) making money? It boils down to a relentless focus on efficiency and scale across the value chain:

• Direct Sourcing Power: The core principle is cutting out the middlemen. Traditional retail involves multiple layers – distributors, wholesalers, regional agents – each adding their own markup. Mingming Hen Mang bypasses most of this by dealing directly with over 2,300 manufacturers. Their massive scale gives them immense bargaining power. They can negotiate lower prices, demand customized product formats (about 25% of their SKUs are custom), and secure favorable payment terms. Some reports even mention they maintain a tradition of prompt or even upfront payments (无账期结算 – wu zhang qi jiesuan, no-credit-period settlement), which suppliers appreciate and may reward with better pricing.
• Lean Supply Chain & Logistics: Moving billions of snacks efficiently is critical. Mingming Hen Mang operates a network of 36 distribution centers (25 self-operated, 11 third-party) strategically located across the country. The goal is for most stores to be within a 300km (186 mile) radius of a warehouse, enabling 24-hour replenishment deliveries. Crucially, most snacks don’t require expensive cold-chain logistics. Combined with sophisticated digital inventory management systems, this keeps warehousing and transportation costs below industry averages.
• High Inventory Turnover: Stale snacks are bad for business and tie up capital. Mingming Hen Mang boasts an impressive inventory turnover rate, averaging just 11.6 days in 2024 (excluding a temporary bump in 2023 due to merger inventory consolidation). This compares favorably to traditional supermarkets, which might take 30 days or more. Faster turnover means fresher products for consumers, less waste from expired goods, and more efficient use of capital.
• Franchise-Fueled Growth: As mentioned, the franchise model is key to their rapid expansion and market penetration. Mingming Hen Mang provides franchisees with store design, product assortment guidance, operational training, marketing support, and, crucially, the supply of low-cost snacks. The company makes its money primarily by selling these snacks to its franchisees, taking a margin on the wholesale price. In 2024, a whopping 99.5% of Mingming Hen Mang’s revenue came from selling goods to its stores (both franchised and the handful of company-owned ones). Franchise and service fees accounted for less than 0.5% of revenue. This aligns the company’s interests with its franchisees: the more snacks the franchisees sell, the more money everyone makes. They even offer competitive subsidies if a rival store engages in aggressive discounting nearby, guaranteeing the franchisee a minimum gross margin (e.g., 15%).
• Operational Efficiency: Zhao Ding’s early focus on optimizing store operations continues. Examples cited include seemingly minor tweaks like changing shelf boxes from slanted to square to reduce restocking time and switching from colored shipping cartons to plain kraft paper boxes to save a few yuan per box. These small savings multiply across thousands of stores and millions of shipments. Standardized store layouts and digital point-of-sale systems also contribute to efficiency.

It’s a high-volume, low-margin game that requires constant vigilance and optimization.

The Financial Picture: Big Revenue, Thin Margins

The IPO prospectus provides the first detailed look at Mingming Hen Mang’s financials, and the numbers are eye-popping, especially the top-line growth:

• Revenue:
  • 2022: ¥4.29 billion
  • 2023: ¥10.30 billion (+140%)
  • 2024: ¥39.34 billion (+282%) (approx. $5.6 billion USD)
• Gross Profit:
  • 2024: ~¥3.0 billion (approx. $428 million USD)
• Adjusted Net Profit:
  • 2022: ¥81 million
  • 2023: ¥235 million (+190%)
  • 2024: ¥913 million (+288%) (approx. $130 million USD)

The revenue trajectory is explosive, fueled by both organic growth and the consolidation of Zhao Yi Ming’s numbers post-merger. However, the profitability figures reveal the core nature of the Liangfan model:

• Gross Margin: Consistently hovered between 7.5% and 7.6% from 2022 to 2024.
• Adjusted Net Profit Margin: Improved slightly from 1.9% in 2022 to 2.3% in 2024.

These margins are razor-thin compared to other retail models. For instance, traditional snack brand Liangpin Puzi (良品铺子) reported gross margins closer to 28% in some periods. Even Mixue Bingcheng, the budget drink king, boasts significantly higher margins (around 30%+), partly because it manufactures many of its own core ingredients.

Mingming Hen Mang operates on the principle of bo li duo xiao (薄利多销) – thin profits, high volume. Their success hinges entirely on massive scale and extreme operational efficiency. There’s very little room for error. Rising costs for raw materials, logistics, or labor could quickly squeeze profitability. Maintaining effective inventory control is also paramount; needing to clear slow-moving stock through heavy discounts could further depress margins.

This low-margin reality underscores the strategic importance of the merger – achieving unparalleled scale was not just desirable, it was essential for survival and profitability in this cutthroat market.

The Money Trail: Investors and the IPO Push

Neither Ling Shi Hen Mang nor Zhao Yi Ming Ling Shi were strangers to venture capital before their merger.

• Ling Shi Hen Mang secured a significant ¥240 million (approx. $34 million USD) Series A round in May 2021, led by heavyweights Sequoia China (now HongShan) and Gaorong Capital, with participation from Qicheng Capital and Mingyue Capital. This funding fueled its initial rapid expansion.
• Zhao Yi Ming Ling Shi raised ¥150 million (approx. $21 million USD) in its Series A round in February 2023, led by Black Ant Capital (a consumer-focused fund) and notably included strategic investment from established snack retailer Liangpin Puzi.

The merger itself attracted further investment. In December 2023, just after combining, the new Mingming Hen Mang group secured a ¥1.05 billion (approx. $150 million USD) strategic investment from two publicly listed Chinese snack companies: Haoxiangni (好想你), known for jujube products, and Yanjinpuzi (盐津铺子), a major producer of preserved fruits and other snacks, itself an IPO success story from Hunan. This backing from industry peers was a strong vote of confidence.

Leading up to the IPO filing, there were further share transfers and investments in early 2024, bringing in entities associated with HongShan Growth, Shanghai Yihai, and BA HM (likely linked to Black Ant). Based on a share transfer in April 2025 where HongShan Growth acquired a 1% stake for ¥100 million, the company’s implied valuation at that point was around ¥10 billion (approx. $1.4 billion USD).

According to the prospectus, Yan Zhou holds roughly 25.75% directly and controls more through holding companies, while Zhao Ding holds about 22.69% via his entity. The investor roster includes HongShan, Gaorong, Black Ant, Haoxiangni, Yanjinpuzi, and employee stock ownership platforms.

Mingming Hen Mang plans to use the IPO proceeds primarily for:

1. Further Store Network Expansion: Continuing the aggressive rollout, likely deepening penetration in existing markets and potentially entering new ones.
2. Supply Chain Optimization: Investing in more warehouses, logistics technology, and potentially more direct manufacturing relationships or capabilities.
3. Digitalization: Enhancing their IT systems for better inventory management, franchisee support, and customer relationship management (they already boast 120 million registered members).

Navigating the Future: Challenges and Next Moves

Despite its dominant position, Mingming Hen Mang faces a challenging road ahead.

• Intensifying Competition: The discount snack market is far from won. Their biggest rival is Wanchen Group (万辰集团), another publicly listed company that pivoted into snacks. Wanchen consolidated several regional brands (like Laiyoupin, Haoxianglai, Yadiyadi, Laopo Daren) under the unified banner Haoxianglai (好想来). At the end of 2024, Haoxianglai had 14,196 stores – just shy of Mingming Hen Mang’s count – and generated ¥31.8 billion ($4.5B USD) in snack revenue. The battle for market share, franchisees, and prime locations remains fierce. Other players, including traditional snack giants like Sanzhi Songshu (三只松鼠 – Three Squirrels), are also entering the discount channel, adding further pressure.
• Margin Pressure: The low-margin model is inherently vulnerable. Any significant increase in operating costs could hurt profitability. Maintaining the perception of “cheapest” while managing costs is a constant balancing act.
• Evolving Consumer Tastes: While value is key, consumer preferences change. Mingming Hen Mang needs to stay agile in its product selection and potentially innovate beyond just offering existing brands cheaply.
• Franchisee Management: Managing a network of over 7,200 franchisees (and growing) is complex. Ensuring consistent store standards, franchisee profitability, and brand alignment across such a vast network is a perpetual challenge.

Mingming Hen Mang is already making moves to address these challenges:

• Developing Private Labels: In February 2025, the company launched its first wave of own-brand products under the Mingming Hen Mang umbrella, spanning categories like meat snacks, dairy, and ice cream. This is a classic retail strategy to improve margins (as they control the entire product lifecycle) and offer unique products unavailable elsewhere, fostering customer loyalty. The success of retailers like Costco (Kirkland Signature) or Aldi demonstrates the power of strong private labels.
• Exploring New Formats: They are experimenting with store concepts beyond pure snacks. The “Zhao Yi Ming Sheng Qian Chao Shi” (赵一鸣省钱超市 – Zhao Yi Ming Money-Saving Supermarket) format, currently being tested, adds everyday items like toiletries, stationery, frozen foods, and even fresh eggs. This pushes them closer to a full-fledged discount grocery model, potentially increasing basket sizes but also pitting them against a wider range of competitors, including traditional supermarkets and community group buying platforms. They’ve also launched experiential concept stores like “Ling Shi Hen Da” (零食很大 – Snacks Are Big) in Changsha, featuring oversized novelty snack packages and Instagrammable designs, and the “Zhao Yi Ming Snack Research Institute” in Guangzhou, aiming to create buzz and deeper brand engagement.
• Boosting Brand Image: Signing pan-Asian superstar Jay Chou as a dual-brand ambassador in July 2024 was a major marketing coup, aimed at elevating the brands’ image and reaching a massive audience. They also launched cute mascot characters (“Xiao Mang” and “Xiao Ming”) and a theme song, echoing Mixue Bingcheng’s successful branding tactics.

The Final Bite: Why This IPO Resonates

The upcoming IPO of Mingming Hen Mang is more than just a financial event; it’s a culmination of major trends shaping China’s consumer economy. It’s a story of:

• Entrepreneurial Spirit: Two young founders identifying a market need and executing relentlessly.
• The Power of Value: How catering to the demand for zhi jiabi (quality-price ratio) unlocked a massive market, especially in lower-tier cities.
• Operational Excellence: Demonstrating that success in low-margin retail requires ruthless efficiency and scale.
• Market Consolidation: Reflecting the pattern of fierce competition leading to mergers among top players in China’s dynamic markets.

For Americans watching China, Mingming Hen Mang offers a glimpse into the dynamism and scale of its consumer market, the sophistication of its retail strategies, and the unique consumer preferences driving growth, particularly in the vast, often underestimated xia chen shichang.

Will Mingming Hen Mang successfully navigate the transition to a public company? Can it sustain its incredible growth while defending its thin margins against fierce competition? Can it successfully evolve its model with private labels and new formats?

The market will be watching closely. As for me, I’ll be keeping an eye on their progress – and maybe grabbing some cheap snacks from my local Ling Shi Hen Mang on the way home. It’s hard to resist that “snack freedom,” after all.